




Being Conscious of Unconscionability in Modern
Times:Heller v Uber Technologies
Jodi Gardner∗
Requiring low-paid drivers to sign an Arbitration Clause removing their right to local court
processes can be unconscionable and, if so, the clause is not enforceable. This was the conclu-
sion reached by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada when considering a contractual
provision that mandated all external dispute resolution processes go through mediation and arbi-
tration in the Netherlands and required upfront fees of $14,500USD to do so. In this case note, it
is argued that the Canadian decision opens the door for the United Kingdom to rethink the role
of unconscionability and how the doctrine could apply to modern contractual arrangements.
Heller v Uber Technologies provides the opportunity to develop the elements of unconscionabil-
ity in a way that tackles inequality of bargaining power in standard form contracts, particularly
when they fall outside the protection of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
INTRODUCTION
Who should decide whether an Uber driver in Ontario is an ‘employee’ under
the relevant employment laws – the courts of Ontario or an arbitrator based in
the Netherlands? This was the key issue to be considered in Heller v Uber Tech-
nologies1 (Heller v Uber).The Supreme Court of Canada came to the conclusion
that a clause requiring a potential litigant to incur upfront costs of $14,500USD
in order to commence arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands was invalid.
The matter should therefore be heard by the Ontario courts. The outcome
itself was uncontentious – not many people would support large companies
wielding power in a way that unjustifiably restricts access to justice.What was
more controversial, however, was the basis on which this decision was made;
the judges in the majority were split as to why the clause was invalid, and there
was also a strong dissenting judgment. The majority found that the arbitration
clause in question resulted from an unconscionable bargain and was therefore
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not enforceable. This note focuses on the ratio of the case and the impact that
it may have on the development of the unconscionability doctrine, particularly
in the United Kingdom (UK).
IMPACT OF THE DECISION
Whilst Heller v Uber is a Canadian Supreme Court case, it is a significant judg-
ment for all common law jurisdictions in two major ways. First, it raises the
issue of if – and how – large companies can utilise arbitration clauses to re-
strict individuals from pursuing lawsuits in their home jurisdiction. Given the
increased use of arbitration clauses and processes, the case has important lessons
for many countries. Secondly, the case also prompts interesting questions about
the application of the unconscionability doctrine to modern day contractual
arrangements.
In the UK, the underlying difficulty of classifying the employment status of
Uber drivers has raised different legal questions and will soon be determined
by the Supreme Court in Uber BV v Aslam2 (Aslam). The Court of Appeal
held, by a majority, that people driving for Uber are ‘workers’ and therefore
entitled to a variety of benefits, including a minimum wage and paid holidays.
Uber have, unsurprisingly, been vocal in their criticism of this decision. The
word ‘unconscionability’ does not appear in Uber BV v Aslam and the case is
concerned with access to justice and employment laws.This, however, does not
detract from the significance of Heller v Uber, which raises important contract
law questions that can be applied to many aspects of employment agreements,
and to a range of other contracts arising from inherent power imbalances. It
would also be a Pyrrhic victory for the litigants in Aslam if they won, but then
found out that the drivers had agreed to arbitration clauses preventing them
accessing the benefits of being designated employees.
BACKGROUND TO HELLER V UBER
The claimant, David Heller, was a driver for Uber in Toronto. He delivered
food for UberEATS starting in 2016, earning approximately $400 to $600 per
week based on 40 to 50 hours of work driving his own vehicle.The defendant,
Uber, is a global business operating in more than 900 cities and 93 countries,
with a customer base of millions of people and businesses.
Heller was required to accept the terms of Uber’s standard form services
agreement before he could commence driving. This occurred by download-
ing Uber’s mobile application (app) and creating an online account. The first
time a driver logs on, they must agree to certain terms and conditions and con-
firm that they have reviewed all the documents. The driver has to click ‘Yes, I
Agree’on their phone before proceeding.There are two potential agreements, a
2 [2019] 3 All ER 489, [2018] EWCA Civ 2748. The case was argued before the courts in July
2020; see A. Bogg, ‘Uber v Heller and the Prospects for a Transnational Judicial Dialogue on
the Gig Economy – II’OxHRH Blog 20 July 2020 at https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/uber-v-heller-
and-the-prospects-for-a-transnational-judicial-dialogue-on-the-gig-economy-ii/ (last accessed
24 July 2020).
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Driver services agreement (for personal transportation) and an UberEATS ser-
vices agreement (for food delivery), which were 14 or 15 pages long. Both
contained a clause stating that the agreement was exclusively governed by
the laws of the Netherlands, and that any dispute must first be dealt with by
mediation before proceeding, if unsuccessful, to arbitration in the Netherlands
(the Arbitration Clause).
The mediation and arbitration process mentioned in the services agreement
is expensive.Whilst the specific figures were not cited in the Arbitration Clause
itself, evidence submitted to the Supreme Court showed that the up-front ad-
ministrative and filing fees of going through mediation followed by arbitra-
tion equated to US$14,500. These fees do not include the additional costs of
travel expenses, legal fees, lost wages and other costs of arbitration participation.
UberEATs drivers earn $20,800 to $31,200 per year (before taxes and expenses),
it was therefore practically and financially prohibitive for any driver to challenge
Uber via the Arbitration Clause.Heller’s counsel submitted evidence that not a
single driver worldwide had invoked the Arbitration Clause against Uber.Con-
sidering that the company has approximately five million drivers, this is quite
remarkable.
Heller commenced proceedings against Uber in 2017 alleging violations of
employment standards legislation. Relying on the Arbitration Clause in the
standard form services agreement, Uber brought a motion to stay these pro-
ceedings in favour of arbitration in the Netherlands.
Motion judge’s decision
At first instance, the motion judge allowed Uber’s stay of proceedings. It was
held that the question of the arbitration agreement’s validity had to be referred
to arbitration in the Netherlands. This was in line with the principle that ar-
bitrators are competent to determine their own jurisdiction. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Seidel v TELUS Communications Inc3 and the On-
tario Court of Appeal’s decision in Wellman v TELUS Communications Com-
pany,4 it was held that the courts must enforce arbitration agreements freely
entered into (even if they are contained in standard form contracts) and should
not put restrictions on parties’ freedom to arbitrate.5 The motion judge also
concluded that the Employment Standards Act 2000 (ESA 2000) did not re-
strict the parties’ rights to arbitrate.Finally, the unconscionability exception was
rejected as the motion judge found there was no evidence that Uber ‘preyed
[on] or took advantage of Mr. Heller or the other Drivers or extracted an im-
provident agreement by inserting an arbitration provision’.6 Heller appealed.
Court of Appeal
The appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal held that objections to the Ar-
bitration Clause could be decided by the Canadian courts and did not need
3 2011 SCC 15, [2011] 1 SCR 531.
4 2017 ONCA 433, 138 OR (3d) 413.
5 Heller v Uber Technologies Inc 2019 ONCA 1 at [17].
6 Heller v Uber Technologies Inc 2018 ONSC 718 at [70].
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referral to the arbitrator. Nordheimer JA (with whom Feldman and Pardu JJA
agreed) held that there were two relevant issues: first, whether the Arbitration
Clause amounts to an illegal contracting out of the ESA 2000, and second
whether the Arbitration Clause is unconscionable.Either wouldmake the clause
invalid. Under the Arbitration Act 1991, the court must stay any proceedings
subject to an arbitration agreement.7 The courts may however refuse to grant
a stay if the agreement is ‘invalid’.8 Heller argued that the Arbitration Clause
was invalid on the basis that it amounted to a prohibited contracting out of an
‘employment standard’under the ESA 2000 and because it was unconscionable.
Uber invoked the ‘competence-competence’principle, stating that the future
arbitrator is competent to decide its own competence (ie has jurisdiction to
decide its own jurisdiction). This was rejected by the Court of Appeal, with
Nordheimer JA determining that the question was not about jurisdiction of the
arbitrator but rather about the validity of the Arbitration Clause, which should
be determined by the court.His Honour then held that the clause constituted a
contracting out of the ESA 2000,as it eliminated the drivers’ ability to complain
to the Ministry of Labour and the right for a subsequent investigation against
Uber.
Nordheimer JA was also highly critical of the motion judge’s finding that
there was no unconscionability, stating that the conclusion was ‘flawed’ because
of ‘palpable and overriding errors of fact’. His Honour was particularly con-
cerned by the judge’s finding that drivers had access to independent dispute
resolution processes in Ontario. This was not the case: all dispute resolution
processes (apart from arbitration) were run by Uber technology or personnel
and were completely controlled by the company.9 Nordheimer JA therefore
applied the traditional four-element test in Titus v William F Cooke Enterprises
Inc,10 holding that the clause was invalid on the grounds of unconscionability.11
The judgment summarised that ‘it can be safely concluded that Uber chose
this Arbitration Clause in order to favour itself and take advantage of its drivers,
who are clearly vulnerable to the market strength of Uber’.12 Nordheimer JA
was unpersuaded by the argument that the company had included the provision
to ensure consistency of outcomes rather than simply to prevent claims being
made against it.He observed that the Arbitration Clause ‘operates to defeat the
very claims it purports to resolve’.13
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Uber appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing for a stricter approach to uncon-
scionability and public policy.The appeal was dismissed,with Côté J dissenting.
The judges in the majority were split as to their reasons for dismissing the
7 Arbitration Act 1991, s 7(1).
8 Arbitration Act 1991, s 7(2)(2).
9 n 4 above at [55].
10 2007 ONCA 573, 284 DLR (4th) 734 at [38]; as confirmed more recently in Phoenix Interactive
Design Inc v Alterinvest II Fund LP 2018 ONCA 98, 420 DLR (4th) 335. The different elements
and tests are discussed in more detail below.
11 n 4 above at [68].
12 ibid at [68.4]
13 ibid at [70].
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appeal. Abella and Rowe JJ’s joint judgment (with Wagner CJ and Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Martin and Kasirer JJ concurring) found the Arbitration Clause
was unenforceable on the grounds of unconscionability, while Brown J based
his decision for Heller on considerations of public policy.
Abella and Rowe JJ held that, according to TELUS Communications Inc v
Wellman, any claim about a potentially unfair arbitration clause should be dealt
with directly through the doctrine of unconscionability.14 Their Honours em-
phasised that this equitable doctrine allows contracts obtained by the abuse of
unequal bargaining powers to be set aside by the courts.Unconscionability pro-
tects individuals who are vulnerable in the contracting process, and is widely
accepted in Canadian contract law.15 Their Honours emphasised that the un-
conscionability doctrine must be balanced against freedom of contract, which
lies at the ‘heart’ of the common law of contract. Extensive common law and
academic literature on freedom of contract and unconscionability was consid-
ered, and it was held that the court can and should prevent the enforcement of
unconscionable contracts: ‘when unfair bargains cannot be linked to fair bar-
gaining … courts can avoid the inequitable effects of enforcement without
endangering the core values on which freedom of contract is based’.16
The judges concluded that it was a ‘classic case’ of unconscionability17 and
the Arbitration Clause was invalid. The specific important factors noted by
Abella and Rowe JJ were: imbalance of power between the two parties, the
role of standard form contracts and inability to negotiate, lack of information
in the Arbitration Clause about mediation and arbitration in the Netherlands,
disproportionate costs associated with arbitration, and the significant impact
the clause would have on Heller’s substantive rights. As the clause was invalid
on the grounds of unconscionability, it was unnecessary to consider whether
it had the effect of contracting out of the mandatory protections of the ESA
2000. An arbitration agreement can be classified as a ‘self-contained collateral
contract’,and this allowed the Arbitration Clause to be severed from the services
agreement between Heller and Uber.18
Brown J agreed in a separate judgement that the Arbitration Clause was in-
valid, but on the grounds that it undermined access to justice and was therefore
contrary to public policy. Whilst the common law has strongly promoted the
importance of freedom of contract to ensure certainty and stability, it is not an
absolute concept.There are many instances where people will not be bound by
contractual agreements, including when the law recognises a ‘paramount con-
sideration of public policy’.19 His Honour emphasised that the concept of public
policy has and should be used sparingly to ensure ‘a disciplined approach’ and
the development of narrow, well-established grounds. One of the established
grounds of public policy precludes an ouster of court jurisdiction. This is to
protect the integrity of the justice system, uphold the rule of law, and ensure
14 [2019] 2 SCR 144 at [85].
15 n 1 above at [55].
16 ibid at [59].
17 ibid at [4].
18 ibid at [96] citing Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation
Ltd [1981] AC 909 (HL).
19 n 1 above at [103] citing In Re Estate of Charles Millar, Deceased [1938] SCR 1, 4.
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an independent judiciary that can vindicate legal rights. Brown J commented
that ‘unless everyone has reasonable access to the law and its processes where
necessary to vindicate legal rights,we will live in a society where the strong and
well-resourced will always prevail over the weak’.20
Uber contended that the enactment of modern arbitration legislation re-
moves the operation of public policy.This was rejected by Brown J.His Honour
emphasised that there is no reason to distinguish between a clause that expressly
blocks access to justice and one that has the effect of doing so.21 Whilst arbi-
tration generally might be regarded as enhancing access to justice, arbitration
clauses like the present one that required substantial upfront payments from in-
dividuals are, in reality, ‘a tool for cutting off access to justice’.22 After reviewing
the context of the agreement between Heller and Uber,Heller’s financial situ-
ation and the cost of arbitration, the Arbitration Clause was held effectively to
bar any claim that Heller may have had against Uber. It was ‘not an agreement
to arbitrate, but rather not to arbitrate’.23
Unlike the rest of the Supreme Court, Côté J would have allowed the stay
– provided Uber advanced to Heller the funds needed to initiate the arbitra-
tion proceedings.The decision contained detailed analysis of arbitration services
in Canada. Her Honour emphasised the importance of enforcing arbitration
agreements, and her concern that the majority decision risked undermining
Canada’s leading role in arbitration law.Despite the evidence of the significant
costs required under the Arbitration Clause, Côté J emphasised that ‘the pur-
suit of access to justice and the enforcement of arbitration agreements are often
complementary objectives… Arbitration enhances access to justice because it
can be more expedient and less costly than litigation.’24
The three separate judgments raise a number of engaging issues that are wor-
thy of further consideration, including the appropriate arbitration jurisdiction,
the elements of an unconscionability doctrine, the role of inequality of power,
and the difficulties of defining drivers’ employment status in the gig economy.
Arbitration jurisdiction
Before the Supreme Court could consider the substantive matter of whether
the Arbitration Clause was invalid, it needed to determine who should answer
this question – the Canadian Courts or an arbitrator based in the Netherlands?
The starting point for this question is the rule in Dell Computer Corp v Union
des consommateurs (Dell), which held that a court must refer all challenges of an
20 ibid at [112].
21 ibid at [113], emphasis in original.
22 ibid at [119]
23 ibid at [102], emphasis in original.
24 ibid at [312]. In light of the cost of arbitration, the wages of Uber drivers and the decisions of other
judges, an argument that arbitration would ‘enhance’ a driver’s access to justice is, in the author’s
opinion, hard to justify. There are also concerns of ‘marketisation and private power capture’: see
F.Wilmot-Smith,Equal Justice (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press, 2019) 143 (and more
generally chapters 7 and 8).
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arbitrator’s jurisdiction to the arbitrator unless one of the specific exceptions
applies.25
Abella and Rowe JJ drew a distinction between Dell and the current case,
holding that issues of accessibility – which were not raised on the facts in
Dell – must be considered. Their Honours commented that:
The underlying assumption made in Dell is that if the court does not decide an
issue, then the arbitrator will. As Dell says, the matter ‘must be resolved first by the
arbitrator’ (para. 84).Dell did not contemplate a scenario wherein the matter would
never be resolved if the stay were granted.This raises obvious practical problems of
access to justice that the Ontario legislature could not have intended when giving
courts the power to refuse a stay.26
Two examples of situations raising accessibility concerns are where (1) it would
be too costly for the applicant or (b) a foreign choice of law clause circumvents
mandatory local policy – for example a clause preventing an arbitrator from
giving effect to the employment law protections in Ontario.27 The judges con-
cluded that in these circumstances the arbitration agreement would be insulated
from any ‘meaningful challenge’. This issue was not relevant in Dell, as the case
was based on the assumption that if the court did not decide the matter, an
adjudicator would.28
The judges were – correctly – concerned that their decision not provide
a green light that allowed parties to circumvent valid arbitration agreements.
It therefore must be determined whether there is a bona fide challenge. This
involves a two-step process; first, whether there is a genuine challenge to the
arbitral jurisdiction and secondly, whether there is a real prospect that, if the
stay were granted, the challenge would never be resolved by the arbitrator.
When applying this process to the facts of the case, it is clear that Uber’s
actions put access to justice at risk.The fees that were required imposed a ‘brick
wall’ against applicants, and the merits of any case could not be considered until
potentially unaffordable fees were paid by the Uber drivers. The details of this
were embedded into an electronic standard form contract. It was appropriate
therefore that the Canadian Courts, rather than arbitrators in the Netherlands,
should have jurisdiction to determine the validity challenge.
Elements of an unconscionability claim
The Supreme Court tackled the very foundation of the unconscionability doc-
trine,with different views on whether a claim has two or four-elements. In the
Court of Appeal, Nordheimer JA followed Titus v William F Cooke Enterprises
Inc29 in holding that there were four elements to unconscionability;
25 [2007] 2 SCR 801 at [84]-[85].
26 n 1 above at [38].
27 ibid at [38].
28 ibid at [40].
29 2007 ONCA 573, 284 DLR (4th) 734 at [38]; as confirmed more recently in Phoenix Interactive
Design Inc v Alterinvest II Fund LP 2018 ONCA 98, 420 DLR (4th) 335.
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(1) A grossly unfair and improvident transaction;
(2) A victim’s lack of independent legal or other suitable advice;
(3) An overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by the victim’s
ignorance or other disability; and
(4) The other party’s knowingly taking advantage of this vulnerability.
Abella and Rowe JJ disagreed with this approach, citing academic support
for a two-element approach to unconscionability: one that requires, first, an
inequality of bargaining power arising from a weakness or vulnerability and,
secondly, an improvident transaction.30 On the first of these elements, the court
emphasised that there are no strict limitations on what constitutes ‘inequality’; it
can arise from personal characteristics of the claimant and/or their circumstan-
tial vulnerability. The effect of the inequality can either affect the individual’s
ability to freely enter or negotiate a contract, or compromise their ability to
understand the impact of a contract they have entered into. On the second el-
ement, a bargain is improvident when it unduly advantages the stronger party
or unduly disadvantages the vulnerable individual. The judges noted that this
issue can take many forms, and determining what makes it improvident ‘cannot
be reduced to an exact science’.31
Uber argued that the Supreme Court should reject the two-part approach
and instead adopt the stricter four-part test.32 This contention was rejected by
Abella and Rowe JJ on the basis that it would result in unconscionability being
‘more formalistic and less equity-focused.’33 The judges also rejected the strict
requirement of the other party knowingly taking advantage, as this shifted the
focus away from the protection of the vulnerable party and towards the state of
mind of the stronger party.34
Whilst only making brief comments on unconscionability, Côté J empha-
sised that Uber was not aware of Heller’s specific circumstances and thus could
not have had the knowledge of his vulnerability that (Her Honour thought)
was necessary for a finding of unconscionability.35 Abella and Rowe JJ dis-
agreed, stating that ‘a rigid requirement based on the stronger party’s state of
mind would … erode the modern relevance of the unconscionability doctrine,
effectively shielding from its reach improvident contracts of adhesion where the
parties did not interact or negotiate.’36
The importance of a knowledge requirement depends on the purported ob-
jective of unconscionability. If the doctrine targets exploitative behaviour, some
knowledge would be necessary.37 However, if the focus is protecting weak indi-
viduals from unfair contracts, why is knowledge relevant? This question is par-
ticularly pertinent for standard form contracts where there is no opportunity to
30 n 1 above at [62]-[65].
31 ibid at [78].
32 ibid at [80].
33 ibid at [82].
34 ibid at [85].
35 ibid at [288].
36 ibid at [85].
37 Hart v O’Connor [1985] UKPC 1 has confirmed a knowledge requirement for unconscionability
in the United Kingdom.
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negotiate,making evidence of specific advantage taking and the stronger party’s
actual knowledge of the vulnerability impossible to adduce. In an era where the
vast majority of contracts entered into by individuals are standard form, requir-
ing actual knowledge of the vulnerability would make the unconscionability
doctrine practically redundant. In the current case,Uber could not have known
the income, education and knowledge level of the individuals clicking ‘Yes, I
agree’ to the standard form services agreement. They do however know the
average annual income of their drivers (and the fact that this is almost the same
as the cost of adjudication in the Netherlands).Provided that constructive knowl-
edge of the disadvantage (or ‘reason to suspect’38) is sufficient, it is hard to argue
why this element would not be fulfilled, even if the more rigid four-part test
were to be used.An insistence on actual knowledge would mean that, provided
the stronger party avoided learning the specific circumstances of the other party,
they would be immune from the resulting agreement being unenforceable on
the grounds of unconscionability. In light of the realities of contracting in the
modern world, such an outcome cannot fairly stand.
The role of inequality of power
There was significant disagreement between the judges on the relationship be-
tween inequality of bargaining power and unconscionability.This is a key issue,
as English law has clearly rejected parties’ attempts to escape contracts merely
on the basis of an inequality of bargaining power.39
The joint decision by Abella and Rowe JJ holds that inequality can be suffi-
cient, provided it (a) arises from a weakness and (b) means that the weaker party
‘may be vulnerable to exploitation in the contracting process’.40 This creates a
circular argument; the vulnerability required for a finding of unconscionability
arises from the inequality of power, which then creates a vulnerability to ex-
ploitation.In rejecting the majority decision,Brown J emphasises that inequality,
even substantial inequality, is not sufficient for a finding of unconscionability
as a specific vulnerability is necessary.41 Côté J shared this concern, stating that
a focus on inequality of power ‘would undermine private ordering and com-
mercial certainty’.42
Inequality of bargaining power in general is not sufficient to undermine con-
tractual arrangements in the UK.The relative strength of the parties is however
at the centre of the law on unconscionability. In 1873 Lord Selborne high-
lighted in Earl of Aylesford v Morris that the doctrine was designed not to ad-
dress outright fraud, but instead something more implicit and nuanced.43 His
Lordship emphasised that it was focused on ‘unconscientious use of the power’
arising from the circumstances and the ‘relative position of the parties’. It is
38 See discussion in M. Chen-Wishart, Unconscionable Bargains (Wellington: Butterworths, 1989)
101-105.
39 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326.
40 n 1 above at [72].
41 ibid at [160].
42 ibid at [257].
43 (1873) R 8 Ch App 484, 490.
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therefore not controversial that, in certain circumstances, the relative difference
in position between the two parties may result in vulnerability or weakness
sufficient for the ‘overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power’ required by
unconscionability. This is of particular concern with standard form contracts
drafted in a heavily one-sided manner by ‘armies of lawyers’.44 As outlined by
Abella and Rowe JJ:
The many ways in which standard form contracts can impair a party’s ability to
protect their interests in the contracting process and make them more vulnera-
ble, are well-documented. For example, they are drafted by one party without in-
put from the other and they may contain provisions that are difficult to read or
understand … The potential for such contracts to create an inequality of bargain-
ing power is clear. So too is their potential to enhance the advantage of the stronger
party at the expense of the more vulnerable one, particularly through choice of law,
forum selection, and arbitration clauses that violate the adhering party’s reasonable
expectations by depriving them of remedies. This is precisely the kind of situation
in which the unconscionability doctrine is meant to apply.45
In other countries, the law has moved away from requiring a specific ‘disabil-
ity’ and instead looks at the situation as a whole. For example,Dalton J recently
held in the Queensland Supreme Court that the ‘situational disadvantage and
vulnerability’ of four coal mining companies was sufficient for a finding of
unconscionability against Adani (a multinational conglomerate company).46 In
light of the standard required for ‘vulnerability’ in English unconscionability
cases, this aspect of Heller v Uber is unlikely to cause any controversy. It is hard
to distinguish between a Post Office telephonist not understanding the impact
of a property transaction in Cresswell v Potter47 and an Uber driver agreeing to
a complex and legalistic arbitration clause in a standard services agreement as
the only way to obtain relatively low-paid work from the company.
The gig economy and defining drivers
The impact of the ‘gig economy’ is central to the issues raised in Heller v Uber.
The gig economy has a number of alleged benefits;Côté J discussed the role of a
‘shared economy’ in her judgement.Her Honour highlighted that Uber’s busi-
ness was ‘part of a vital and growing sector of Canada’s economy which could
be stifled if the majority’s reduced threshold for inequality of bargaining power
is adopted’.48 But is it worth having a sector of the economy that only works
by breaking – or at the very least, stretching – the law? The changing labour
market has created complexities and opened up new spaces for exploitation of
the economically vulnerable; many countries around the world have grappled
44 Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak [2007] UKEAT 0535, [2007] IRLR 560 at [57].
45 n 1 above at [89].
46 Adani Abbot Point Terminal Pty Ltd v Lake Vermont Resources Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 260. This case
has been appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal.
47 [1978] 1 WLR 255.
48 n 1 above at [267].
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with the legal impacts of the gig economy, or are currently dealing with these
issues.49
The basis of Heller v Uber was a desire for drivers to be classified as ‘employ-
ees’ and hence acquire employment rights under Ontario law.There is however
a related issue of whether the drivers are ‘consumers’ or ‘traders’; if they are not
protected by employee rights, can they be protected by consumer rights? In his
concluding remarks, Nordheimer JA highlighted that even if Uber is correct
and their drivers are not employees, they are akin to consumers in terms of
their relative bargaining position. They are not being represented by a union,
they are at the ‘mercy’ of Uber, and the contract was entered into by clicking ‘I
Agree’on a downloaded app.This is not the case under UK law.As Uber drivers
enter into the services agreement ‘for purposes [of their] trade, business, craft
or profession’,50 they are very likely to be classified as traders. The impact of
this is that the drivers would not be entitled to the benefit of various (and often
powerful) consumer protection mechanisms, such as the Unfair Terms provi-
sions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.51 This makes the unconscionability
doctrine even more important for ensuring fairness and transparency within
the common law of contract.
Brown J commented that it is unnecessary to look at this issue through the
lens of unconscionability, as the validity of the Arbitration Clause can be de-
termined by public policy. The ability for arbitration clauses to remove legisla-
tive rights and/or prevent claimants from accessing their judicial rights, such
as class-action lawsuits and punitive damages, has been discussed in depth.52
Brown J’s approach is court-centric; all it does is focus on ensuring access to
the courts, but it does not provide any further protection. In contrast, the de-
cision of Abella and Rowe JJ provides a much-needed pathway for litigants to
challenge potentially unfair terms, particularly if they do not fall within the
remit of the relevant consumer protection regime. It is easy to imagine that a
services agreement between a large corporation and a lower-income individual
could contain a range of potentially unfair terms – restraint of trade clauses, un-
fair fees and charges,unbalanced cancellation clauses, and penalties for failure to
obtain a certain level of performance.These types of clauses are not addressed by
Brown J’s public policy approach or by UK statute law. Looking at the services
agreement through the lens of unconscionability has the benefit of providing a
framework for addressing other potentially unfair terms,particularly in standard
form business agreements.
49 This case is focused on contract, and the consequences have been raised in many other areas, such
as tort law (Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants [2020] UKSC 13) and employment law (Uber
BV v Aslam [2019] 3 All ER 489, [2018] EWCA Civ 2748). For further discussion, see J. Prassl,
Humans as a Service (Oxford: OUP, 2018).
50 Consumer Rights Act 2015, s 2(2).
51 It is however recognised that drivers would still have rights under the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 (UK).
52 See for example M.Radin,Boilerplate:The Fine Print,Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); J. Resnik, ‘Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights’ (2015) 124 Yale Law
Journal 2804;R. Kar and M.Radin, ‘Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis’ (2019) 132
Harvard Law Review 1135.
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Jodi Gardner
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Supreme Court of Canada could have chosen to focus on the questions of
public policy demanding the preservation of access to justice, something which
has been recently addressed by the UK Supreme Court.53 This may have been
a more natural fit; Brown J commented that framing the issues around uncon-
scionability amounted to ‘forcing a square peg into a round hole’.54 His Honour
was concerned that the decision of Abella and Rowe JJ would result in a drastic
expansion of the doctrine’s reach without providing meaningful guidance on
how the doctrine could and should develop. The common law’s role however
is to develop concepts and legal principles to suit new circumstances and chal-
lenges.Heller vUber has started the process of how unconscionability may tackle
new forms of contracting – such as agreements made by clicking ‘I Agree’ on
an app55 – and future courts will have the opportunity to further refine the
scope of the doctrine.
Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine that has developed and evolved over
time.In the 19th century version of unconscionability protected expectant heirs,
and sales at considerable undervalue by ‘poor and ignorant’ persons. In the
20th century, the test of ‘poor and ignorant’ was updated to include ‘members
of the lower income group’ and the ‘less highly educated’. It therefore seems
fitting that the doctrine should be used in the 21st century to prevent a multi-
national company from enforcing an unfair and one-sided arbitration clause
against their drivers. The world has changed immeasurably since the first case
on unconscionability; contracts can now be agreed by clicking a box in an
online app with challenges to these agreements being determined by a privately
paid arbitrator in another country applying the laws of a different jurisdiction.
Despite these changes, individuals and institutions continue to take advantage
of power imbalances and vulnerabilities – and contract law must be able to
respond effectively to substantively unfair bargains arising from these situations.
The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v Uber opens the door for
English courts to develop unconscionability in a way that can respond fairly
and transparently to the new challenges faced by contract law.
53 See R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 and A. Adams and J. Prassl, ‘Vexatious
Claims: Challenging the Case for Employment Tribunal Fees’ (2017) 80 MLR 412.
54 n 1 above at [103].
55 Unconscionability and standard form contracts in and of itself is not a ‘new’ issue: see, for example,
L. Kornhauser, ‘Unconscionability in Standard Forms’ (1976) 64 California Law Review 1151;
Davidson v Three Spruces Realty Ltd (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 481 (BCSC).
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